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KELO V. NEw LONDON: AN
OPPORTUNITY LOST TO REHABILITATE
THE TAKINGS CLAUSE
Christian M. Orme *
IN NO OTHER COUNTRY IN THE WORLD IS THE LOVE OF PROPERTY KEENER OR MORE
ALERT THAN IN THE UNITED STATES, AND NOWHERE ELSE DOES THE MAJORITY DIS-
PLAY LESS INCLINATION TOWARD DOCTRINES WHICH IN ANY WAY THREATEN THE WAY
PROPERTY IS OWNED.I
I. INTRODUCTION
Eminent domain is the inherent power of the sovereign to acquire pri-
vately owned property, when necessary, to further its legitimate activities and
2purposes. Although few people dispute the necessity and utility of enabling
government entities to acquire private property to fill indispensable societal
needs, this power often conflicts with the fundamental rights of an individual to
own and use private property.3 Indeed, individual property rights have been
referred to as the "guardian of every other right," and to deprive people of
individual property rights "is in fact to deprive them of their liberty."4
Thus, it is no surprise that the crowning achievement of the American
Revolution, the U.S. Constitution, provides significant protection for individual
property interests. 5 The most critical of these protections is the "Takings
Clause" in the Fifth Amendment, which prohibits "private property [from
being] taken for public use without just compensation."6 The U.S. Supreme
Court so valued the right to private property that it made the Fifth Amendment
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I ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 614 (J.P. Mayer & Max Lerner eds.,
George Lawrence trans., Harper & Row 1966).
2 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 562 (8th ed. 2004).
3 Joseph J. Lazzarotti, Public Use or Public Abuse, 68 UMKC L. REV. 49 (1999).
4 ARTHUR LEE, AN APPEAL TO THE JUSTICE AND INTERESTS OF THE PEOPLE OF GREAT BRIT-
AIN, IN THE PRESENT DISPUTE WITH AMERICA 14 (4th ed. 1775).
' Lazzarotti, supra note 3, at 58.
6 Donald J. Kochan, "Public Use" and the Independent Judiciary: Condemnation in an
Interest-Group Perspective, 3 TEX. REv. LAW & POL. 49, 51 (1998).
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first among the rights enumerated in the Bill of Rights to be incorporated
through the Fourteenth Amendment as a protection against state-action. 7
Despite the historical importance of private property rights in America, the
current interpretation of the Takings Clause provides insufficient protection for
individual property rights.8 The current paucity of protection for individual
property rights became national news on June 23, 2005, when the U.S.
Supreme Court held, in Kelo v. City of New London ("Kelo"), that local gov-
ernments could seize homes, business, churches, and any privately owned prop-
erty for private and public economic development. 9
Although Kelo made front-page news, the attack on individual property
rights has been gaining momentum for years. A list of recent examples will
help illustrate this point. In Riviera Beach, Florida, the local city council spent
$1.25 billion taxpayer dollars on a development plan that condemned the prop-
erty of 300 local businesses and 1,700 residential homes-homes that housed
around 5,100 people.' The city planned to sell the land to private developers
for yachting, shipping, and tourism interests.''
In Kansas City, Kansas, Wyandotte County took private property belong-
ing to 150 families and turned it over to the Kansas International Speedway for
a NASCAR racing track.' 2 The legislature argued that the racetrack would
create 1,700 jobs and $300 million in economic activity. 13 Although some
residents had lived in their homes for up to fifty-two years,' 4 the Supreme
Court of Kansas held that construction of the racetrack was a "valid public
purpose" and authorized the use of eminent domain.' 5
In Long Branch, New Jersey, developers have current plans to "redevelop
the central core of the city" by razing beachfront residential properties for high-
end condos. 6 Understandably, some residents have no desire to sell.' 7 One
resident, Denise Hoagland, was so disgusted with the developer's attempts to
buy her home that she painted "NOT FOR SALE" in red, white, and blue on
7 See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 478-79, 482
(2d ed. 2002) referencing Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R.R. Co. v. City of Chicago, 166
U.S. 226 (1897).
8 Kochan, supra note 6, at 51.
9 See Kelo v. City of New London, 125 S. Ct. 2655 (2005).
' Brief for Better Gov't Ass'n et al. as Amici Curiae supporting Appellants, Kelo v. City of
New London, 125 S. Ct. 2655 (2005) (No. 04-108) (citing Scott McCabe, Residents Vow to
Fight Riviera Plan, THE PALM BEACH POST, Dec. 17, 2001) [hereinafter Better Government
Association].
'" Id. (citing Thomas R. Collins, Many Businesses Feeling Put Out by Riviera Plans, THE
PALM BEACH POST, Jan. 6, 2003, at IA).
12 DANA BERLINER, PUBLIC POWER, PRIVATE GAIN: A FIVE-YEAR, STATE-BY-STATE
REPORT EXAMINING THE ABUSE OF EMINENT DOMAIN 79 (2003); see Tomasic v. United
Gov't., 962 P.2d 543 (Kan. 1998).
13 Lazzarotti, supra note 3, at 57.
14 Id. at 56.
'5 Tomasic, 962 P.2d at 543.
16 Emily Bazar, For N.J. Family, Ruling May Doom Beach Cottage, USA Today, August 2,
2005, at A-1, available at http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2005-08-02-eminent-
domain-inside-x.htm. (last visited Sept. 15, 2005).
17 Id.
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her fence.18 The City of Long Branch is prepared to use eminent domain if the
residents will not cooperate and sell their property. 19
Finally, in Las Vegas, Nevada, the Las Vegas Redevelopment Agency
condemned and demolished an entire city block to make way for more casino
parking.2 ° Although the block contained many thriving businesses and residen-
tial homes that were neither blighted nor posed any threat to the community,
the Nevada Supreme Court ruled in favor of the casino because the benefits of
the casino parking would trickle down and benefit the community at large.2
The U.S. Supreme Court sanctioned this behavior in Kelo. Rather than
enforce the Takings Clause as a protection for private property interests, the
Court essentially eliminated the role of the Takings Clause as a bona fide limit
on government power. 2 The Court's broad interpretation of the Takings
Clause in Kelo permits large corporations, big box retailers, and wealthy devel-
opers to influence local governments and legislatures to use eminent domain
for private purposes. 23 In essence, the Court in Kelo abdicated its responsibil-
ity to restrict the use of eminent domain and uphold the Takings Clause.2 4 As
Chief Justice Joseph Story commented:
[G]overnment can scarcely be deemed free where the rights of property are left solely
dependent upon the will of a legislative body without any restraint. The fundamental
maxims of a free government seem to require that the rights of personal liberty and
private property should be held sacred.... We know of no case in which a legisla-
tive Act to transfer the property of A to B without his consent has ever been held a
constitutional exercise of legislative power in any State of the Union. 25
To understand the significance of Kelo, an examination of the historical
development and a survey of the current status of the Takings Clause is neces-
sary. Following an examination of historical development, this note evaluates
Kelo specifically. Finally, this note suggests that the U.S. Supreme Court made
a mistake in Kelo by allowing eminent domain for private development, and
that there exists a better framework for analyzing the Takings Clause.
II. HiSTORICAL DEVELOPMENT
The history of the Takings Clause is one of continued erosion. This sec-
tion evaluates this erosion in three historical developments. The first analyzes
the zealous protection of individual property rights in early America. The sec-
ond chronicles the continued erosion of these same rights by the Supreme
18 Id.
19 Id.
20 City of Las Vegas Downtown Redevelopment Agency v. Pappas, 76 P.3d I (Nev. 2003),
cert denied, 124 S. Ct. 1603 (2004).
21 See id.
22 Kelo, 125 S. Ct at 2671 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
23 See Poletown Neighborhood Council v. Detroit, 304 N.W.2d 455, 458 (Mich. 1981),
overruled by County of Wayne v. Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d 765 (2004). See also Parija
Bhatnagar, Eminent Domain: A Big Box Bonanza?, June 23, 2005, available at http://
money.cnn.com/2005/06/23/news/fortune50/retaileminentdomain/index.htm. (last visited
June 24, 2005).
24 Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2677 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
25 Steven M. Simpson, Judicial Abdication and the Rise of Special Interests, 6 CHAP. L.
REV. 173, 198 (2003) (quoting Wilkinson v. Leland, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 627, 657-58 (1829)).
[Vol. 6:272
KELO V. NEW LONDON
Court. The third segment analyzes the current renaissance of individual prop-
erty rights occurring at the state level as a result of the negative public senti-
ment toward the Kelo decision.2 6
A. Protection of Private Property Interests
After the collapse of the Articles of Confederation, the authors of the Con-
stitution recognized the need for a strong central government.27 The smaller
states and federalist supporters shared a common concern regarding how best to
restrain this newly created, and very powerful, central government from
infringing on state and individual rights.2 8 In the arena of individual property
rights, the founders sought to limit the power of the central government via the
Fifth Amendment in the Bill of Rights, which prohibits "private property [from
being] taken for public use without just compensation." 29
Initially, the Supreme Court took great measures to curb the "despotic
power" of eminent domain.3 ° In Vanhorne's Lessee v. Dorrance, the Supreme
Court was faced with a challenge to a statute enacted by the Pennsylvania Leg-
islature in 1795, which sought to resolve a festering land dispute between a
group of Pennsylvania residents and a subsequent group of settlers from Con-
necticut.3' The statute vested the settlers from Connecticut with title, thereby
taking the property of the Pennsylvania claimants.32 However, the Supreme
Court held the statute unconstitutional, reasoning that it is "difficult to form a
case in which the necessity of a state can be of such a nature, as to authorize or
excuse the seizing of landed property belonging to one citizen, and giving it to
another citizen."
33
Three years later, in Calder v. Bull, the Court continued its staunch
defense of private property.34 In Calder, the plaintiff argued that the Court
should reverse a probate court decision ex post facto because the Connecticut
Legislature enacted a statute that undermined the decision of the probate
court.35 The Court refused to support a decision that "takes property from A
and gives it to B." 3 6 The Court further noted that "the genius, the nature, and
the spirit of our State Governments" is that "the general principles of law and
26 Emily Bazar, States Move to Protect Property, USA Today, August 3, 2005, available at
http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2005-08-02-eminent-domainx.htm. Many state leg-
islators and courts are starting to align themselves with the positions of advocates like Ala-
bama state senator Jack Biddle who expressed this view when he said, "we don't like
anybody messing with our dogs, our guns, our hunting rights, or trying to take property from
us." Id.
27 CHEMERINSKY, supra note 7, at 10.
28 Lazzarotti, supra note 3, at 58.
29 See U.S. Const. amend. V.
30 Vanhome's Lessee v. Dorrance, 2 U.S. 304, 311 (1795).
31 Id. at 304.
32 Id.
33 Id. at 311.
34 3 U.S. 386 (1798).
35 Id. at 386-87.
36 Id. at 388.
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reason" prohibit these types of legislation.3 7 The Court summed up its ratio-
nale by stating:
The Legislature may enjoin, permit, forbid, and punish; they may declare new
crimes; and establish rules of conduct for all its citizens in future cases; they may
command what is right, and prohibit what is wrong; but they cannot change inno-
cence into guilt; or punish innocence as a crime; or violate the right of an antecedent
lawful private contract; or the right of private property. To maintain that our Federal,
or State, Legislature possesses such powers . . .. [is] a political heresy, altogether
inadmissible in our free republican governments.
38
After the Civil War, on July 9, 1868, the states ratified the Fourteenth
Amendment, which applied some of the protections guaranteed by the Bill of
Rights concerning the federal government to the individual states.3 9 The Court
again showed its support of individual property rights by making the Fifth
Amendment the first portion of the Bill of Rights to be incorporated against the
states through the Fourteenth Amendment.4" This was, perhaps, its last show
of strong support for such rights.
B. Erosion of Private Property Interests
Although the Supreme Court initially interpreted the Takings Clause nar-
rowly, the Court began to erode this precedence in Head v. Amoskeag Manu-
facturing Co.4 In Head, the Court evaluated the constitutionality of the Mill
Acts.4 2 The Mill Acts were statutes that permitted riparian landowners who
operated mills, to flood neighboring lands in order to power their grist mills.4 3
The Court held that this was a valid taking under the Takings Clause because
the mills were open for public use, benefited the public, and served as a public
utility."4 However, in addition to the public mills, the Court appeared to
approve takings by private mills operated purely for the benefit of the private
owners.45 This was a landmark decision because, until this point, the only pri-
37 Id.
38 Id. at 388-89.
39 Lazzarotti, supra note 3, at 58-59.
40 Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R.R. Co. v. City of Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897). See
CHEMERINSKY, supra note 7, at 478-79, 482 (referencing the incorporation of different
amendments).
41 113 U.S. 9 (1885).
42 See Brief for Prop. Rights Found. of Am., as Amicus Curiae Supporting Appellants, Kelo
v. City of New London, 125 S. Ct. 2655 (2005) (No. 04-108) [hereinafter Brief for Prop.
Rights Found. of Am.].
41 Id. Grist mills are used to grind grain and corn. WEBSTER'S NEW WORLD DICTIONARY
OF AMERICAN ENGLISH 595 (3rd Col. ed. 1988). In general, grist mills were open to the
entire public on a nondiscriminatory basis for the grinding of corn. See RICHARD A.
EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN 172 (1985).
" Head, 113 U.S. at 18-19.
45 Head, 113 U.S. at 9. The Court decided the case in favor of the local government "based
on the ground that the statute was a permissible regulation of the riparian owners' common
interest in a stream of water adjacent to their lands." Brief for Prop. Rights Found. of Am.,
supra note 42. Although the Supreme Court appeared to recognize that condemning neigh-
boring land for the use of a private entity violated the A to B principle articulated by Justice
Story, the Court ultimately refused to address directly the issue of transferring land from
private groups to other private groups. Id.
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vate companies that had been allowed to invoke the power of eminent domain
were railroad companies, which most considered a public highway.4 6
Nearly seventy years later, the Court continued to erode the potential pro-
tection offered by the Takings Clause to private property owners in Berman v.
Parker.47 In Berman, the District of Columbia condemned several parcels of
"slum" land in an effort to eradicate blight. 48 The action was pursuant to a
declaration by Congress to eliminate "substandard housing and blighted
areas." 4 9 However, the proposed taking of private property for a private devel-
oper was contested by property owners who argued that taking land from one
private property owner in order to turn it over to a different private property
owner violated the Takings Clause.5"
The Court held that "when the legislature has spoken ... rt]he role of the
judiciary in determining whether that power is being exercised for a public
purpose is an extremely narrow one."'" In using the term "public purpose," the
Court seemed to adopt the notion that any public purpose was tantamount to a
"public use."52 Thus, while a narrow interpretation of Berman would merely
allow local governments to use eminent domain to eradicate blighted areas,53 a
more legislature-friendly interpretation of Berman would permit the use of emi-
nent domain not only for public use, but also for the public benefit. The legis-
lature-friendly interpretation encouraged many local and state legislatures to
use eminent domain as a tool for luring and retaining corporations. Perhaps the
most infamous example of this behavior is Poletown Neighborhood Council v.
City of Detroit.54
In Poletown, General Motors Corporation announced that it planned to
close its Cadillac and Fisher plants in Detroit, Michigan. 55 However, GM
offered to build a new assembly plant if it could obtain a suitable site, requiring
that the site be at least 450-500 acres, rectangular in shape, and provide access
to a long-haul railroad line and to the freeway system.56 To avoid massive
unemployment and to keep the assembly plant local, Detroit condemned the
entire residential community of Poletown for $200 million. 57 The condernna-
46 Brief for James M. Buchanan et al. as Amicas Curiae Supporting Appellants, Kelo v. City
of New London, 125 S. Ct. 2655 (2005) (No. 04-108) [hereinafter Brief for James M.
Buchanan et al.].
47 348 U.S. 26 (1954).
48 Id. at 31.
49 Id. at 28. It is important to note that Congress is the legislative authority in the District of
Columbia, which includes police powers that are normally excluded from Congressional
reach. Id. at 31.
50 Id. at 31.
51 Id. at 32.
52 Robert H. Freilich and Robin A. Kramer, Condemnation for Economic Development Vio-
lates Takings Clause: The Michigan Supreme Court Overturns Historic Poletown Decision,
27 No. 10 ZONING & PLAN. L. REP. 1, 2 (Patricia Salkin & Kenneth Young eds. 2004).
53 See id.
14 304 N.W.2d 455 (Mich., 1981).
" Id. at 460 (Fitzgerald, J., dissenting).
56 id.
17 Stephen J. Jones, Trumping Eminent Domain Law: An Argument for Strict Scrutiny
Analysis Under the Public Use Requirement of the Fifth Amendment, 50 SYRACUSE L. REV.
285, 295 (2000).
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tion included churches, schools, and hospitals, and displaced 3,438 residents.58
After the condemnation, in an obviously transparent move to benefit GM, "the
city then resold the land to GM for $8 million, a mere 4% of the purchase value
of the town."
'5 9
Although the residents of Poletown protested the condemnation on the
basis that it did not constitute a public use, 60 the city argued persuasively that
the eminent domain seizures were justified to prevent the pending unemploy-
ment crisis and to spur "economic development. ' 61  Specifically, the city
claimed that the transfer of land would increase jobs via the construction and
operation of the plant, and improve the local economy; a legitimate public pur-
pose under Berman.
62
The Supreme Court of Michigan agreed with the city. The court stated
that the judicial standard for determining a public use is whether the city can
provide substantial proof that the public will be the primary beneficiary of the
condemnations.6 3 In other words, as one scholar has noted, "[b]y shifting the
analysis to 'benefits,' the [Poletown] court established a standard which looks
to the effects of a taking, thereby converting the determination into a matter of
policy instead of a matter of law."64
Although the majority decision in Poletown illustrated the increasingly
blurred line between public and private use created by the Court in Berman, the
dissent by Justice Ryan provides a point of needed perspective. He noted,
"how easily government, in all branches, caught up in the frenzy of perceived
economic crisis, can disregard the right of the few in allegiance to the always
disastrous philosophy that the ends justify the means. '"65
Three years after Poletown, the U.S. Supreme Court, rather than reinforce
the Takings Clause, continued to expand the broad interpretation of the Takings
Clause in Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff.66 At the time of Midkiff, sev-
enty-two private landowners controlled nearly one-half of the property in
Hawaii.6 7 The Hawaiian legislature criticized the oligopoly for "skewing the
State's residential fee simple market, inflating land prices, and injuring the pub-
lic tranquility and welfare."6 8 To correct the situation, the legislature passed
the Land Reform Act of 1967 .69 The legislature intended to redistribute
Hawaiian property in order to reduce the concentration of land and eliminate
58 Id.
59 Id.
60 Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit, 304 N.W.2d 455, 461 (Mich. 1981).
61 Editorial, Review & Outlook: Poletown's Revenge, WALL ST. J., Aug. 3, 2004, at A10.
See also Poletown, 304 N.W.2d at 475 (Ryan, J., dissenting) (stating that the majority's
reliance on Berman "was particularly disingenuous").
62 See Poletown, 304 N.W.2d at 459.
63 Id.
4 Kochan, supra note 6, at 71.
65 Poletown, 304 N.W.2d at 465 (Ryan, J., dissenting).
66 467 U.S. 229 (1984).
67 Id. at 232.
68 Id. The State and Federal Governments owned almost forty-nine percent of the land in
Hawaii while seventy-two private landowners owned forty-seven percent of the land. This
problem was traceable to the original ownership rights vested in high chiefs of the Hawaiian
Islands. Id.
69 Id. at 233.
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the oligopoly.7" In response, the landowners complained that the State was
merely taking their non-blighted property in order to give it to another private
owner. They argued that this was a violation of the protections afforded them
by the Fifth Amendment.71
The Court reiterated that it is within the "legislature's judgment as to what
constitutes a public use."72 However, the Court further stated that it would
enter the fray only if the public use was "palpably without reasonable founda-
tion."73 Indeed, Midkiff made the public use requirement coterminous to the
scope of the local government's police power so long as the state could provide
a reasonable foundation.7 4 The Court effectively interpreted the Takings
Clause so broadly that it stripped itself of any authority to protect an individ-
ual's private property interests. 75 The Supreme Court had placed the Takings
Clause on a slippery slope, one that "[s]tate and local governments have been
happily sliding down .. .ever since. "76
C. The Current Status of the Takings Clause and County of Wayne
v. Hathcock
In spite of the Kelo decision, many state courts and legislatures have
found the use of eminent domain for private economic development unpalat-
able.77 For instance, Alabama and Delaware have already passed laws to miti-
gate the effects of Kelo, while California, Colorado, Illinois, Michigan,
Nevada, New Jersey, New York, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Texas, and Utah have
bills pending.7 8
70 Id.
71 See id. at 234-35.
72 Id. at 241.
71 Id. (quotations omitted).
74 Id. at 240.
75 The notion of the Supreme Court abdicating its responsibility to protect individual prop-
erty rights was noted by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor noted in her dissent in Kelo. Kelo v.
City of New London, 125 S. Ct. 2655, 2677 (2005) (O'Connor , J., dissenting).
76 Poletown's Revenge, supra note 61, at AI0 ("[T]oday we have governments taking land
from Peter because they'd rather Paul have it."); see also DANA BERLINER, PUBLIC POWER,
PRIVATE GAIN: A FIVE-YEAR, STATE-BY-STATE REPORT EXAMINING THE ABUSE OF EMI-
NENT DOMAIN 2 (2004) (indicating that 10,282 cases of condemnations by eminent domain
were filed or threatened in forty-one states from Jan. 1, 1998, to Dec. 31, 2002). However,
this number may be too low. Normally, states do not keep such records. The number above
was taken from newspapers, published and unpublished court opinions and any other court
documents, which mentioned a taking. Connecticut, ironically, is the only state to keep such
records, indicated that 543 redevelopment condemnations were officially filed, but the Con-
necticut press only reported thirty-one of them. Thus, the number of cases, though stagger-
ing, may only represent a small portion of the total number of takings. Id.
" These states include Arkansas, Kentucky, Maine, New Hampshire, South Carolina, and
Washington. See generally, City of Little Rock v. Raines, 411 S.W.2d 486 (Ark. 1967); City
of Owensboro v. McCormick, 581 S.W.2d 3 (Ky. 1979); Opinion of the Justices, 131 A.2d
904, 906 (Me. 1957); Karesh v. City Council, 247 S.E.2d 342 (S.C. 1978); Petition of Seat-
tl, 638 P.2d 549 (Wash. 1981). This list of cases is available at http://www.ncsl.org/
programs/natres/emindomainuphold.htm (last visited October 18, 2005).
78 Alabama: H.R. 14, 1st Spec. Sess. (Ala. 2005); S. 68, 1st Spec. Sess. (Ala. 2005);
California: Assemb. Const. Amend. 22 (Cal. 2005); S. Const Amend. 15 (Cal. 2005);
Assemb. 590, 2005-2006 Legis. Sess. (Cal. 2005); Colorado: H.R. 1203, 64th Gen.
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In an ironic twist, Michigan has led the way in protecting private property
rights by overturning the Poletown decision in County of Wayne v. Hathcock
and opting for stricter interpretation of its own takings clause. 79 Further, the
Michigan Supreme Court provided a framework for evaluating condemnations
that better adheres to the original intent of the Takings Clause than the Supreme
Court's decision in Kelo.
Although the Hathcock decision "must come as cold comfort to the citi-
zens of Poletown," it represents a realization by a state supreme court that the
protection of individual property rights guaranteed in the Fifth Amendment is
not for sale.80 Hathcock County renovated its Metropolitan Airport by produc-
ing a new terminal and jet runway. 8 1 However, the new runway generated a
tremendous amount of noise, which not only annoyed local residents, but also
depreciated the value of their homes.8 2 To solve this problem, the county
started the Pinnacle Project ("the Project"); 83 a 1300-acre public area denoted
to developers for the development of business and technology. 84
To accomplish the Project, the county, with the help of the Federal Avia-
tion Administration ("FAA"), began to purchase neighboring properties
through voluntary sales. 85 However, the plots purchased were "scattered in a
checkerboard pattern throughout the areas south of Metropolitan Airport."86
Finally, the county managed to acquire over 1000 acres, leaving just forty-six
private and seemingly unobtainable parcels.87 To remedy the situation, in
April 2001, the county commenced a series of condemnation actions for the
remainder of the land needed for the Project.88
Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Colo. 2004); Delaware: S. 217, 143rd Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Del.
2005); Illinois: H.R. 4091, 94th Gen. Assemb. (II1. 2005); Michigan: H.R. 5060, 2005-2006
Legis. Sess. (Mich. 2005); Nevada: Assemb. 143, 73rd Sess. (Nev. 2005); S. 326, 73rd Sess.
(Nev. 2005); New Jersey: S. 2739, 211th Leg. (N.J. 2005); New York: Assemb. 8865,
2005-2006 Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2005); S. 5936, 2005-2006 Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2005); S.5938,
2005-2006 Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2005); Oregon: H.R. 3505, 73rd Legis. Assemb. (Or. 2005);
Pennsylvania: H.R. 1835, 2005 Gen. Assemb. (Pa. 2005); H.R. 1836, 2005 Gen. Assemb.
(Pa. 2005); Texas: H.R. 12, 79th Leg., 2d Spec. Sess. (Tex. 2005); H.R. 16, 79th Leg., 2d
Spec. Sess. (Tex. 2005); S. 7, 79th Leg., 2d Spec. Sess. (Tex. 2005); H.J. Res. 11, 79th Leg.,
2d Spec. Sess. (Tex. 2005); S.J. Res. 5, 79th Leg., 2d Spec. Sess. (Tex. 2005); H.R.J. Res.
19, 79th Leg., 1st Spec. Sess. (Tex. 2005); S.J. Res. 10, 79th Leg., 1st Spec. Sess. (Tex.
2005); S. 62, 79th Leg., 1st Spec. Sess. (Tex. 2005); Utah: S. 184, 2005 Gen. Sess. (Utah
2005). Information and status of state bills are available at http://www.ncsl.org/programs/
natres/post-keloleg.htm (last visited September 15, 2005), and http://www.ncsl.org/
programs/natres/emindomainleg.htm (last visited September 15, 2005). Congress has also
proposed a bill for minimizing the use of eminent domain. S. 1313, 109th Cong. (2005).
79 684 N.W.2d 765 (Mich. 2004). The author would like to note and give attribution to
Robert Freilich and Robin A. Kramer's article on the Hathcock and Poletown cases. It was
very helpful. See generally, Freilich, supra note 52.
80 Poletown's Revenge, supra note 61, at A10.
81 County of Wayne v. Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d 765, 770 (Mich. 2004).
82 Id.
83 Id.
84 Id.
85 Id.
86 Id. As part of the agreement to purchase the property, the County had agreed with the
FAA to put the land to economical use. Id.
87 Id. at 771.
88 Id.
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Relying on Poletown, the county argued that the use of eminent domain
was appropriate for the Project, regardless of the lack of blight, because the
Project was rationally related to the conceivable public purpose of improving
the local economy.8 9 Specifically, the county argued that the Project would
"create thousands of jobs, and tens of millions of dollars in tax revenue, while
broadening the County's tax base from predominantly industrial to a mixture of
industrial, service, and technology."9
The county also argued that the Project would "enhance the image of the
County in the development community," help the area "meet the needs of the
21st century," and "attract national and international businesses, leading to
accelerated economic growth and revenue enhancement."9 1 One expert testi-
fied that the Project would create thirty-thousand jobs and add $350 million in
tax revenue for the county.92 The Michigan Supreme Court was not persuaded
and disagreed with the use of eminent domain.
In its decision, the Michigan Supreme Court established a group of three
tests ("the Hathcock Tests") for determining whether to justify a condemnation
under Michigan state law. Satisfaction under any of the Hathcock Tests is suf-
ficient for the use of eminent domain. First, eminent domain must be limited to
those enterprises that generate public benefit, and whose very existence
depends on the use of land that can only be provided by the central government
("Public Necessity Test").93 Second, a public use exists where the private
entity remains accountable to the public in its use of that property ("Public
Accountability Test").94 Third, a public use exists when the selection of the
condemned land for a private interest is based on immediate public concerns
and facts of independent public significance ("Public Concern Test").9 5
Justice Ryan originally suggested the Public Necessity Test in his dissent-
ing opinion in Poletown where he listed "highways, railroads, canals and other
instrumentalities of commerce" as examples of this type of necessity. 9 6 This
type of situation merits a legitimate taking under the Takings Clause because
the public requires these instrumentalities of commerce and their construction
would be "a logistical and practical nightmare" without the use of eminent
domain.9 7
The Hathcock majority also noted that if the necessity test did not exist, it
would allow citizens to extort the government and delay essential public works
projects. For example:
A corporation constructing a railroad, for example, must lay track so that it forms a
more or less straight path from point A to point B. If a property owner between
points A and B holds out-say, for example, by refusing to sell his land for any
amount less than fifty times its appraised value-the construction of the railroad is
89 Id.
90 Id. at 770.
91 Id. at 770-71.
92 Id. at 771.
93 Id. at 781.
94 Id. at 782.
95 Id. at 783.
96 Id. at 781 (citing Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit, 304 N.W.2d 455,
473 n.16 (Ryan, J., dissenting) (1981).
97 Id. at 782.
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halted unless and until the railroad accedes to the property owner's demands. And if
owners of adjoining properties receive word of the original property owner's wind-
fall, they too will refuse to sell.
9 8
The Michigan Supreme Court held that the takings in Hathcock did not
satisfy the Public Necessity Test.99 The court stated that the creation of a busi-
ness and technology park was "not an enterprise 'whose very existence depends
on the use of land that can be assembled only by the coordination of the central
government.' ,,0 On the contrary, the country is "flecked with shopping cen-
ters, office parks, clusters of hotels, and centers of entertainment and
commerce."101
The second test adopted by the Michigan Supreme Court was the Public
Accountability Test. 102 The court noted that the transfer of condemned prop-
erty is consistent with the public use as long as the private entity remains
accountable to the public in its use of that property. 103 For example, the court
disallowed a "condemnation that would have facilitated the generation of water
power by a private corporation because the power company '[would] own,
lease, use, and control' the water power."' 1 4 However, the court added that a
private entity could take by eminent domain if that same taking would be
"devoted to the use of the public, independent of the will of the corpora-
tion.' 1 5 For example, as Justice Ryan noted in Poletown, "a petroleum pipe-
line . . . used pursuant to directions from the . . . Public Service Commission,
and the state would be able to enforce those obligations" is the type of public
use that is still accountable to the public.
0 6
The court in Hathcock again found that the Project failed to pass Constitu-
tional muster. The court held that the project was not under the oversight of the
public, and had provided no way to ensure that the community would have
access to'use the property. 107 Specifically, the private owners and operators
involved in the Project were free to "pursue their own financial welfare with
the single-mindedness expected of any profit-making enterprise."'0 8 In addi-
tion, there was no "formal mechanism" to ensure that the businesses would
continue to benefit the local economy.' ° 9
The final test applied in Hathcock was the Public Concern Test. This test
required the court to evaluate the controlling purpose in the condemnation.
One example that the court gave was described in In re Slum Clearance."0 In
Slum Clearance, the city of Detroit removed unfit housing sectors to advance
98 Id. at 781-82.
99 Id. at 783.
lOO Id. (quoting Poletown, 304 N.W.2d at 478) (Ryan, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original)).
101 Id.
102 Id. at 782.
103 Id.
"O Id. (quoting Berrien Springs Water Power Co. v. Berrien Circuit Judge, 94 N.W. 379
(1903); Poletown, 204 N.W.2d at 479) (Ryan, J., dissenting)).
1o5 Id. (quoting Poletown, 304 N.W.2d at 476) (Ryan, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original)).
106 Id. (citing Lakehead Pipe Line Co. v. Dehn, 64 N.W.2d 903 (1954)).
107 Id. at 784.
1o8 Id.
109 Id.
110 In re Slum Clearance, 50 N.W.2d 340 (Mich. 1951).
[Vol. 6:272
KELO V. NEW LONDON
public safety and health because public safety and health were legitimate public
purposes justifying condemnation."' Regardless of the destination of the sub-
sequent resale of land, the economic ramifications caused by the resale were
incidental to the goal of the condemnation.' '
2
The Project again failed under the third test." 3 The court found nothing
in the Project that suggested that the condemnation of the property would be an
immediate and clearly understood public benefit. 1 4 Contrary to the test, the
court held that the only public benefits for the project were to occur well after
the condemnation.1 15
Hathcock was a striking reversal of judicial philosophy in the area of pro-
tecting private property rights. Although the Michigan Supreme Court evalu-
ated the Hathcock taking under the Michigan Takings Clause located within the
Michigan Constitution, both the Michigan and federal Takings Clauses allow
the use of eminent domain for a "public use."' 16
III. KELO V. CITY OF NEW LONDON
17
A. General Background
New London, Connecticut, is a picturesque and historic town, located at
the junction of the Thames River and the Long Island Sound.'1 8 Despite its
beautiful surroundings and historic heritage, New London has fallen into hard
economic times.' In fact, the New London economy became so stagnate that
the State Office of Policy and Management designated it a "distressed
municipality."' 2
To improve the local economy, local government officials created the
New London Development Corporation ("NLDC"). 12 1 In January 1998, the
State authorized over $15 million in bonds toward the support of the NLDC
and the creation of Fort Trumbull State Park. 122 One month later, Pfizer, Inc.,
("Pfizer"), an international pharmaceutical company, announced that it was
III Id.
112 Id. at 343.
''3 Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d at 784.
114 Id.
115 Id.
116 MICH. CONST. art. X, § 2. The Michigan Constitution states, "Private property shall not
be taken for public use without just compensation therefor [sic] being first made or secured
in a manner prescribed by law. Compensation shall be determined in proceedings in a court
of record." Id. The public use requirement in the Michigan Constitution, like the Takings
Clause in the U.S. Constitution, allows the use of eminent domain only for a "public use."
See, Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d at 770.
''7 125 S. Ct. 2655 (2005).
118 Id. at 2658.
119 Id. New London recently lost approximately 1900 government sector positions, and the
closure of the United States Naval Undersea Warfare Center resulted in a transfer of more
than 1000 positions to Rhode Island. Kelo v. City of New London ("Kelo 1"), 843 A.2d
500, 510 (Conn. 2004). New London's unemployment rate was nearly double that of Con-
necticut and its population was at its lowest mark since 1920. Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2658.
120 Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2658.
121 Id. at 2659.
122 Id.
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developing a $300 million global research center in Fort Trumbull.' 23 At
roughly the same time as the announced Pfizer project, and upon State
approval, New London adopted the Fort Trumbull Municipal Development
Plan ("development plan"), which was prepared and recommended by the
NLDC to coordinate Fort Trumbull State Park and the Pfizer site.
1 24
The development plan covered approximately ninety acres, broken into
seven "parcels" of land designated for different development projects. 125
These parcels included plans for a waterfront hotel and conference center, mari-
nas for both transient tourist boaters and commercial fishing vessels, a public
walkway along the waterfront, an urban neighborhood, 90,000 square feet of
high-technology research space, and 140,000 square feet of parking and retail
space to be developed by private developers under the city's supervision.'
26
Although the NLDC was able to obtain most of the seven parcels without
eminent domain, several property owners refused to sell.'2 7 As a result, the
NLDC, under the authority of the city, voted to use the power of eminent
domain to acquire the properties within the needed area from the owners who
remained unwilling to sell.1 28 However, the NLDC did not file the actions
under Connecticut's urban renewal plan, 129 which allowed the use of eminent
domain to clear slums or blighted areas, but under its authority to create Munic-
ipal Development Projects. 3 o The private landowner petitioners sought declar-
atory and injunctive relief from the condemnation actions from the New
London Superior Court who granted the landowners relief on one disputed
piece of property, but denied relief on the other. '' Both sides appealed the
decision to the Supreme Court of Connecticut.'
32
B. Connecticut Supreme Court
The Connecticut Supreme Court evaluated the taking under the U.S. Con-
stitution by applying the expanded definition of public use created in Berman
and Midkiff, i.e., courts should defer to the state legislature's police power as
long as the use of eminent domain was rationally related to a conceivable pub-
lic purpose.' 3 3 Thus, if a taking could be classified as a function of the local
government's police power, which includes the regulation of public health,
safety, morals, and general welfare, then the taking does not violate the Fifth
123 Id.
124 Brief for the Petitioner, Kelo v. City of New London, 125 S. Ct. 2655 (2005) (No. 04-
108).
125 Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2659.
126 Kelo 1, 843 A.2d 500, 509 (Conn. 2004). See also Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2659.
127 Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2660.
128 Kelo I, 843 A.2d at 510-11. Although the development plan needed the entire seven
parcels to complete the project, only parcels 3 and 4 required the use of eminent domain.
Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 124. In parcel 3, the development required the condem-
nation of four properties owned by three landowners for the construction of private office
space and parking. Id. Parcel 4 required the city to condemn eleven homes owned by four
individuals for "park support." Id.
129 CONN. GEN. STAT. § 8-124 (2003).
130 Id. § 8-186. See Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 124.
13' Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 124.
132 Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2660.
133 Kelo I, 843 A.2d at 527 (citing Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 232 (1984).
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Amendment.' 34 New London, like many other cities, saw eminent domain "as
a means to enhance private economic development via the new public benefit
test." 135
Under this analysis, New London argued that eminent domain was appro-
priate because the development plan served a public benefit. New London
anticipated that the development would revitalize the rest of the city and build a
"momentum" toward economic improvement for New London. 1 36 Specifi-
cally, the city anticipated that the project would generate between:
(1) 518 and 867 construction jobs; (2) 718 and 1362 direct jobs; and (3) 500 and 940
indirect jobs. The composite parcels of the development plan also are expected to
generate between $680,544 and $1,249,843 in property tax revenues for the city, in
which 54 percent of the land area is exempt from property taxes .... These gains
would occur in a city that, with the exception of the new Pfizer facility . . .has
experienced serious employment declines .... Indeed, the state office of policy and
management has designated the city a "distressed municipality."'
137
The tenants argued that the taking was wholly unconstitutional and unfair
for several reasons. Many of the tenants wished to remain in their homes
where their families were raised and had lived for decades. 138 They also
argued that they had grown attached to their homes and the Fort Trumbull area,
especially because of its access to the waterfront. 139 Indeed, many of them had
expended a significant amount of time, money, and effort renovating their
properties. 140
On March 9, 2004, the Connecticut Supreme Court held that none of the
condemnations violated the Takings Clause in the U.S. Constitution because
New London's proposed economic development was a valid public use. 1 The
court stated several reasons for this holding. First, the court evaluated the tak-
ing based on the intent and motives of the legislature. 142 In other words, the
court was convinced that the legislature and city intended to benefit the com-
munity through the research park. 14 3 Second, the court found that the takings
were reasonably necessary" and for "reasonably foreseeable needs.'
'1 45
Finally, the court was inclined that this was the realm of the legislature and that
the courts should defer to the legislature's judgment in matters of economic
114 See 26 AM. JuR. 2o Eminent Domain § 47.1 (2004).
1"5 See Freilich, supra note 52, at 1.
136 Kelo 1, 843 A.2d at 509.
137 Id. at 510.
138 id. at 511. Petitioner, Wilhemina Dery was born in her Fort Trumbull house in 1918 and
lived there her entire life. Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2660.
139 Kelo 1, 843 A.2d at 511. Susette Kelo had lived in the Fort Trumbull Area since 1997
and had made substantial improvements to her home and prized her view of the water. Kelo,
125 S. Ct. at 2660.
140 Kelo 1, 843 A.2d at 511.
141 Id. at 500.
142 Id. at 512.
143 Id. at 512, 542-43.
144 Id. at 552.
141 Id. at 558-59. The three dissenting justices would have imposed a "heightened" stan-
dard of review and would have found the taking unconstitutional because New London
failed to show that the economic benefits would surely come to pass. Id. at 574.
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development. 14 6 The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine
whether the city's takings satisfied the Takings Clause.' 47
C. U.S. Supreme Court
On June 23, 2005, the Supreme Court, in a 5-4 decision,' 48 with Justice
Stevens writing for the majority, upheld the Connecticut Supreme Court's deci-
sion. 149 The majority held that New London's development plan fell within the
scope of the Takings Clause because it would serve a public purpose.150 The
Court emphasized that the judicial branch must defer to the legislature when
deciding whether a public purpose is valid and justifies the use of the takings
power. 5 ' Thus, in the eyes of the majority, New London's plan for economic
rejuvenation was a valid public purpose and entitled to judicial deference.' 5 1
Although the majority of justices upheld the Connecticut Supreme Court's
decision, the minority was very vocal in its criticism of the decision. Justice
O'Connor, in a stinging dissent, claimed that the majority had effectively
"delete[d] the words 'for public use' from the Takings Clause of the Fifth
Amendment."'1 53 She argued that Berman and Midkiff were distinguishable
from Kelo in that the public use in both of those cases was the elimination of a
public problem,' 5 4 where as the public use in Kelo would allow the taking of
property from one private person and the transfer of it to another private owner,
so long as the local legislatures and governments put the property to a "higher
use." ' 5 5 She concluded that the Court had abdicated its responsibility to
enforce the Constitution.'
56
Justice Thomas also wrote a dissenting opinion. Justice Thomas agreed
wholeheartedly with Justice O'Connor's notions that the majority had read the
Takings Clause out of existence.' 57 Justice Thomas, however, would have
reconsidered the entire body of case law dealing with the Takings Clause and
allowed the government to "take property only if the government owns, or the
public has a legal right to use, the property, as opposed to taking it for any
public purpose or necessity whatsoever."' 158
146 Id. at 569.
147 Kelo v. City of New London, 125 S. Ct. 27 (2004).
148 Kelo v. City of New London, 125 S. Ct. 2655, 2658 (2005). The majority included
Justices Stevens, Kennedy, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer. The dissent included Justices
O'Connor, Rehnquist, Scalia, and Thomas.
149 Id. at 2668. Although Justice Kennedy concurred with the majority's decision, he wrote
a concurring opinion advocating courts to look into the purposes and intent of the taking to
discover impermissible favoritism. See id. at 2669-70 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
150 Id. at 2662. The Court specifically mentioned that the public purpose interpretation of
the Takings Clause was the "broader and more natural interpretation." Id.
151 Id. at 2663-64.
152 Id. at 2665. As though expecting a public outcry, the majority explicitly invited states
to place further restrictions on the exercise of eminent domain. Id. at 2668.
153 !d. at 2671 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
154 Id. at 2675 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
155 Id. at 2677 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (citing Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of
Detroit, 304 N.W.2d, 455 (Mich. 1981)).
156 Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
157 Id. at 2678 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
1-58 Id. at 2679 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
[Vol. 6:272
KELO V. NEW LONDON
IV. THE SUPREME COURT WAS WRONG TO ADOPT THE KELO DECISION
Although the need for eminent domain for the public good is readily
apparent, and local governments always want additional revenue, the U.S.
Supreme Court was wrong to adopt the Kelo decision. First, Kelo allows the
legislature to decide whether its use of eminent domain is congruent with the
Takings Clause. This precedent is undesirable because the unchecked judg-
ment of the legislature is not adequate protection for the protection of private
property rights. Second, the Kelo decision, while intending to promote local
economies at a seemingly low cost, creates a number of economic and non-
economic problems. Third, Kelo set a much more dangerous precedent and is
more detrimental to private property rights than either Berman or Midkiff. At
their core, Berman and Midkiff required an already existing problem before any
taking could occur. Kelo, however, does not require an existing problem in
connection with the property, but allows legislatures to trade up property for a
more lucrative result.
For these reasons, this Note recommends that the Court adopt a series of
tests similar to those created in Hathcock for evaluating the constitutionality of
the Takings Clause. The Hathcock Tests would re-enthrone the judiciary as the
guardian of private property rights and thereby avoid many of the pitfalls that
will likely result from the adoption of the Kelo rationale.
A. The Legislature is Inadequate Protection Against Eminent Domain
Abuse
The judicial branch is, and must be, the protector of individual property
rights for several reasons. First, the Constitution directs that the judiciary is to
serve as "an intermediate body between the people and the legislature, in order,
among other things, to keep the latter within the limits assigned to their author-
ity."15 9 As James Madison stated:
[Clonstitutional interpretation must be left to the reasoned judgment of independent
judges, rather than to the tumult and conflict of the political process. If every consti-
tutional question were to be decided by public political bargaining, the Constitution
would be reduced to a battleground of competing factions, political passion and parti-
san spirit. 1 60
Indeed, the Court memorialized this ideology in Marbury v. Madison in
which Chief Justice Marshall stated, "[it is emphatically the province and duty
of the judicial department to say what the law is."' 61
Second, local governments, even well-intentioned local governments, can-
not adequately protect individual property rights because it is fundamentally
contrary to their design. The essential purpose of the legislative branch of local
government is to correct and improve local municipalities. Indeed, their con-
tinuing status as our elected representatives depends upon their ability to pro-
159 THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 524-25 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. David Wootton ed.,
2003).
160 U.S SUPREME COURT BOOKLET, THE COURT AND CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION,
available at http://www.supremecourtus.gov/about/constitutional.pdf (last visited Oct. 6,
2005) (quoting James Madison).
161 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803).
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vide constituents with a better today and promises of a better tomorrow. As a
logical consequence, the community expects that their representatives act to
improve the general community in the most rigorous manner accepted under
the law. Therefore, the option to create jobs, increase the local tax base,
improve the local economy, and ensure their own reelection is too irresistible
for even the most noble local governments because these are the exact func-
tions that they were elected to perform. Thus, representatives will always place
the perceived greater good of the community, and their own reelection, before
the rights of an individual. The logical role of the legislature is not, and never
can be, to protect individual property rights.
To prevent local governments from succumbing to the pressure and allure-
ments of large corporations, the U.S. Supreme Court should have strengthened
the Takings Clause to prevent the destructive lobbying efforts of large corpora-
tions and wealthy developers. As James Madison stated, "[fin framing a gov-
ernment which is to be administered by men over men, the great difficulty lies
in this: You must first enable the government to control the governed; and in
the next place oblige it to control itself." '162 In order for the government to
control itself, the judicial branch must create a narrow interpretation of the
Takings Clause to force the government to control itself effectively, thereby
protecting individual property rights.
B. A Broad Interpretation of the Takings Clause Creates Both Economic
and Non-Economic Problems.
The obvious justification for the use of eminent domain by local govern-
ments is to benefit their communities. Generally, the alleged community bene-
fits take the form of a perceived improvement to the local economy. However,
local economies do not always reap the rewards of the perceived improve-
ments. Instead, yielding to private interests can create a variety of unintended
consequences and dangerous economic and non-economic problems.
1. Economic Problems
Perhaps the most ironic pitfall caused by property takings intended to
improve local economies is that the city itself does not always recoup what it
loses from a change of land ownership. For example, a recent study in Missis-
sippi evaluated the economic impact of introducing a Wal-Mart into the local
area and concluded that the "net increases [were] minimal as the new big-box
stores merely capture[d] sales from existing business in the area."' 16 3 Further,
not only did the big store merely capture existing business, the study demon-
strated that the local economy was actually worse off because the bulk of the
money generated by the large store did not remain in the local area. 1 64 Many
of the savings created by the large corporation were due to cost-saving and
specializing maneuvers that reinvested the money elsewhere. 165 The new store
162 THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 356 (James Madison) (David Wootton ed., 2003).
163 Better Government Association, supra note 10 (citing Anthony Bianco & Wendy
Zellner, Is Wal-Mart Too Powerful?, Bus. WEEK, Oct 6, 2003).
164 Id.
165 Id.
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actually was a drain on the local economy because local merchants were much
more likely to reinvest locally.
166
In addition to the loss of money in the local economy, the introduction of
large corporations and developments inflict additional economic losses due to
the relocation and displacement of individuals. 167 For instance, eighty-six per-
cent of individuals that relocated after the city condemned their property were
paying more rent because of their dislocation.' 68 The increase in rents and
mortgages created an unwanted incentive to relocate into more affordable
areas.
Along with the economic losses created by displaced individuals, the loss
of local businesses also strains the local economy. National numbers indicate
that roughly between twenty-five and forty percent of businesses fail after
being relocated because of renewal projects. 16 9 In particular, one study of
139,000 businesses reported that one out of every three failed after relocation
due to eminent domain.' 70 This is not surprising since most local businesses
rely on intangibles such as customer relationships, tradition, or their unique
locations for their success. Local businesses cannot readily replace the
intangibles that made them successful. The loss of local businesses is particu-
larly disturbing when viewed in the light of job growth because, by one esti-
mate, small businesses account for sixty to eighty percent of all new jobs
annually created in the United States, and employ at least half of all private
sector workers. 171
The introduction of large companies makes local markets much more sus-
ceptible to outside market factors. For instance, a nationwide store in a local,
vibrant market may nevertheless be in danger of closing because of uncontrol-
lable market factors elsewhere. For example, when K-Mart filed for bank-
ruptcy, 600 of its "box-like" stores never reopened. 172 These closed stores
depreciated local areas, blighted local landscapes, and left local communities
extremely challenged to pick up the slack. K-Mart also laid off 55,000 employ-
ees in the process, leaving most without the skills necessary to start their own
businesses. 17
3
Moreover, the corporations often cannot live up to their own promises and
expectations. In Poletown, General Motors promised the city of Detroit that
166 Id.
167 Id.
168 Id. (citing HERBERT J. GANS, THE URBAN VILLAGERS: GROUP AND CLASS IN THE LIFE
OF ITALIAN-AMERICANS 380 (2d. 1982)).
169 Brief for America's Future, Inc. et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner, Kelo v.
City of New London, 125 S. Ct. 2655 (2005) (No. 04-108) [hereinafter Brief for America's
Future, Inc.] (citing John P. Elwood, Focus on Urban America: Re-thinking Government
Participation in Urban Renewal: Neighborhood Revitalization in New Haven, 12 YALE L.
& POL'Y REV. 138, 180 (1994)).
170 Better Government Association, supra note 10 (citing RICHARD BERNARD ET AL., DOWN-
TOWN, INC.: How AMERICA REBUILDS CITIES 35 (1989)).
171 Brief for America's Future, Inc., supra note 169 (citing SEC Tells Congress It Hopes to
Minimize Sarbanes-Oxley Impact on Small Business, FINANCIALWIRE, Sept. 7, 2004)).
172 Id. (citing Sridhar Krishnaswami, K-Mart to Merge with Sears, Roebuck & Co., Busi-
NESS LINE, Nov. 18, 2004).
173 Id.
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the construction of a new car factory would create more than 6,000 jobs. 174 To
placate General Motors, Detroit destroyed 1,400 residential structures, 600
businesses, and paid $200 million as just compensation to those displaced. 175
However, seven years later, the General Motors Plant had only created half of
the promised number of jobs. 17 6
Another economic problem created by a broad definition of the Takings
Clause is that it precipitates rent-seeking behavior. According to one commen-
tator, one of the fundamental purposes of the Constitution is to protect against
"a single underlying evil: the distribution of resources or opportunities to one
group rather than another solely on the ground that those favored have exer-
cised the raw political power to obtain what they want."' 7 7 Economists refer to
this "underlying evil" as rent-seeking behavior. Rent-seeking occurs when a
member of society expends energy or resources "in order to bring about an
uncompensated transfer of goods or services from another person or persons to
one's self as the result of a 'favorable' decision on some public policy."' 7 8
Rent-seeking in the arena of the Takings Clause occurs when corporations
or private developers encourage government officials to condemn private prop-
erty for the specific purposes of a few. Special treatment by local governments
provides these rent seekers with land sites at "the expense of the taxpayers,
consumers, or other groups or individuals with which the beneficiaries may be
in economic competition."' 79 This behavior is an unfair and economically
wasteful practice that enables private developers and corporations to use the
government's power of eminent domain to capture a surplus value that is not
available to other members of the marketplace. 8 ' For example:
Suppose government takes one dollar from each of 100 people and gives it all to
person X. It is in X's interest to spend at most $100 to convince the government to
174 Better Government Association, supra note 10. (citing Ilya Somin, Poletown Decision
did not Create Desired Benefits, DETROIT NEWS, Aug. 8, 2004, at 13A).
175 Id. (citing Ilya Somin, Poletown Decision did not Create Desired Benefits, DETROIT
NEWS, Aug. 8, 2004, at 13A; Marie Michael, Detroit at 300: New Seeds of Hope for a
Troubled City, DOLLARS AND SENSE, July 2001).
176 Id. (citing Ilya Somin, Poletown Decision did not Create Desired Benefits, DETROIT
NEWS, Aug. 8, 2004, at 13A).
177 Cass R. Sunstein, Naked Preferences and the Constitution, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1689
(1984).
178 Paul M Johnson, A Glossary of Political Economy Terms, http://www.auburn.edu/
-johnspm/gloss/rent-seeking-behavior.html (last visited Aug. 25, 2005).
179 Id.
I80 Brief of James M. Buchanan et al., supra note 46 (citing RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS:
PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN 163-64 (1985)).
If the sum of all wealth in the state of nature is 100 and that in society is 150, then there is a
potential surplus of 50, which must be distributed .... The surplus created by political life is
distributed not only at the formation of the state but also during the course of its operation.
When the state acquires private property for public use, the public use requirement should ensure
the "fair" allocation of surplus by preventing any group frim approaching more than a pro rata
share. Takings for private use are therefore forbidden because the takers get to keep the full
surplus, even if just compensation is paid.
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do this again; but it is only in the interest of each victim to spend $1 to convince it to
leave them alone. 181
In other words, the taxpayers and property owners assume the costs of the
gratuitous gift, while the benefits go alone to the rent-seeker.' 82 Indeed, if
some private interest groups get what they want, other corporations will begin
to rent-seek at the expense of the taxpayer.183 Eventually the government
could, or has already, become a pawn in a chess game of large money interests.
In this type of game, the loser will always be the taxpayer.
However, like in all competitions, where there are losers there must be
winners as well. As Justice O'Connor noted:
The beneficiaries are likely to be those citizens with disproportionate influence and
power in the political process, including large corporations and development firms.
... The Founders cannot have intended this perverse result. "[Tihat alone is a just
government," wrote James Madison, "which impartially secures to every man,
whatever is his own."'
184
The ability of large corporations, development firms and influential people
to get those benefits that are unavailable to the common populace is neither a
fair practice nor constitutional.
2. Non-Economic Problems
A broad interpretation of the Takings Clause not only creates economic
problems, it also creates non-economic problems. However, unlike many of
the economic problems, the non-economic damage to communities and social
infrastructures is often irreversible.
The use of eminent domain to condemn neighborhoods threatens organiza-
tions that are critical to the community. For example, religious and other chari-
table entities are especially prone to eminent domain abuse because they are
tax-exempt and do not employ many people."'S Although they do not provide
much direct economic benefit to the town, few would question the importance
of these institutions to local communities. Many people go to these places
during times of national, regional, and personal crises to obtain physical sup-
port in the form of food and medical attention. In addition, churches and simi-
lar institutions provide spiritual and emotional services that attempt to heal the
lonely, depressed, and downtrodden. Even the Supreme Court has noted that
religious institutions are "beneficial and stabilizing influences in community
life. ,, 18
6
The abuse of eminent domain for private interests depreciates the value of
property rights. A community that values private property interests provides its
181 Id. (citing RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMI-
NENT DOMAIN 163-64 (1985)).
182 Kochan, supra note 6, at 81.
183 Brief of James M. Buchanan et al., supra note 46. (citing RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAK-
INGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN 163-64 (1985)).
184 Kelo v. City of New London, 125 S. Ct. 2655, 2677 (2005) (O'Connor, J., dissenting)
(quoting For the National Gazette, Property (Mar. 29, 1792), reprinted in 14 PAPERS OF
JAMES MADISON 266 (R. Rutland et al. eds., 1983)).
185 Brief of The Becket Fund for Religious Liberty in Support of Petitioners, Kelo v. City of
New London, 125 S. Ct. 2655 (2005) (No. 04-108).
186 Walz v. Comm'r, 397 U.S. 664, 673 (1970).
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citizens with an incentive to work and improve property. 187 For example, in
the arena of foreclosure, the state allows a person to redeem foreclosed prop-
erty after a judicial sale. This statutory right of redemption depreciates the
value of the house at a foreclosure sale because the buyer is unsure that he will
retain the property even after the purchase is complete. Similarly, it is also true
in a community that operates under the possibility that the government can
deprive property owners of the fruits of their labors through a broad use of
eminent domain. Indeed, those property owners with valuable property appear
most at risk.
Another non-economic pitfall caused by condemnation is the loss of com-
munity. Local authorities often fail to realize the social costs of eradication of
a functioning social system. 188 The dissolution of a neighborhood scatters
church memberships, grade school classes, athletic teams, lifelong friendships,
and extended family units. One commentator stated that every neighborhood is
like a "sidewalk ballet," where the people and buildings all play unique parts in
the lives of the other persons in the neighborhood.' 8 9 Just as it was impossible
for the king's soldiers to put Humpty Dumpty together again after his fall, no
governmental programs can put these fractured neighborhoods back together.
Indeed, it would seem that the writers of the Constitution provided the Fifth
Amendment specifically to protect against these societal ills and problems by
enabling the judiciary to act as a gatekeeper to protect the property owner when
the legislature begins to intrude on a citizen's individual rights.
A broad definition of Public Use will have a disproportionate negative
impact on certain groups in the community. As Justice Thomas stated:
Of all the families displaced by urban renewal from 1949 through 1963, 63 percent of
those whose race was known were nonwhite, and of these families, 56 percent of
nonwhites and 38 percent of whites had incomes low enough to qualify for public
housing, which, however, was seldom available to them." 190 In 1981, urban plan-
ners in Detroit, Michigan, uprooted the largely "lower-income and elderly" Poletown
neighborhood for the benefit of the General Motors Corporation. 19 1 Urban renewal
projects have long been associated with the displacement of blacks; "[i]n cities across
the country, urban renewal came to be known as 'Negro removal.' ' 192 Over 97
percent of the individuals forcibly removed from their homes by the "slum-clear-
ance" project upheld by this Court in Berman were black. 193 Regrettably, the pre-
dictable consequence of the Court's decision will be to exacerbate these effects.
1 94
187 Kochan, supra note 6, at 57 (citing G. WARREN NUTTER, POLITICAL ECONOMY AND
FREEDOM 94-102 (1983)).
188 Better Government Association, supra note 10. (citing R. Scor FOSLER, DOES Eco-
NOMIC THEORY CAPTURE THE EFFECTS OF NEW AND TRADITIONAL STATE POLICIES ON Eco-
NOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN COMPETITION AMONG STATES AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS:
EFFICIENCY AND EQUITY IN AMERICAN FEDERALISM 249 (Daphne A. Kenyon & John Kin-
caid eds., 1991)).
189 Id. (citing JANE JACOBS, DEATH AND LIFE OF GREAT AMERICAN CITIES, 50-51 (1961)).
190 Kelo v. City of New London, 125 S. Ct. 2655, 2687 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (quoting B.
FRIEDEN & L. SAGALAYN, DOWNTOWN, INC. How AMERICA REBUILDS CITIES 17, 28 (1989)).
191 Id. (quoting J. WYLIE, POLETOWN: COMMUNITY BETRAYED 58 (1989)).
192 Id. (quoting Pritchett, The "Public Menace" of Blight: Urban Renewal and the Private
Uses of Eminent Domain, 21 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 1, 47 (2003)).
193 Id. (quoting Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 30 (1954)).
194 Id.
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Unfortunately, history and Justice Thomas are correct and the results, as
Justice O'Connor stated, "will not be random."'
' 95
C. Kelo Sets An Uncharted and Dangerous Precedent
The Kelo decision is a dangerous precedent because it introduces a much
more expansive interpretation of the Takings Clause than Berman or Midkiff.
Although Berman and Midkiff expanded the Takings Clause, both decisions
required that the legislature identify an already existing problem before taking
property by eminent domain. In Berman, the legislature was attempting to cor-
rect a blighted area that was deemed "injurious to the public health, safety,
morals and welfare" of the District of Columbia.' 9 6 In Midkiff, the Hawaiian
Legislature attempted to correct a damaging oligopoly that was "skewing the
State's residential fee simple market, inflating land prices, and injuring the pub-
lic tranquility and welfare."' 9 7 In the instance of Kelo, the homes and proper-
ties were not a problem, but merely in the wrong locale.
Perhaps the most dangerous result of Kelo is that it does not require legis-
latures to identify an existing problem before invoking the power of eminent
domain. In essence, state legislatures no longer need to rely on their police
power to eliminate existing problems. Now legislatures can take property for
the sole purpose of trying to improve local economies-a central goal of every
legislature. For example, New London conceded that the condemned area was
not blighted and that it was a vital part of the neighborhood, but the city never-
theless took the property to improve the local economy nevertheless.' 9 8 This
broad interpretation of the Takings Clause justifies condemnations via eminent
domain for practically any purpose, so long as the government tethers the pro-
posed use to a potential, or even speculative, economic benefit. To prevent this
infringement on private property rights, the Supreme Court should have
adopted a test that strengthens the protection of the Takings Clause.
D. Hathcock is a Better Alternative
Although there were a variety of tests available for consideration, the
Court should have adopted a test permitting local governments to govern their
constituencies without unduly infringing on individual property interests. 199
195 Id. at 2677 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
196 Berman, 348 U.S. at 28.
197 Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 232 (1984).
198 Kelo 1, 843 A.2d 500, 520 (Conn. 2004).
'99 Several tests are currently being used to determine the scope of the Takings Clause.
Such tests include a test for heightened scrutiny in Delaware and North Dakota. Wilmington
Parking Auth. v. Land with Improvements, 521 A.2d 227, 231 (Del. 1987); City of James-
town v. Leevers, 552 N.W.2d 365, 372-74 (N.D. 1996). Florida and Washington use a test
that poses the question of whether the benefit would exist but for the private benefit. If the
answer is yes, then the public purpose is primary and other benefits will not defeat the
condemnation. Baycol v. Downtown Dev. Auth. of the City of Fort Lauderdale, 315 So.2d
451, 456 (Ha. 1975); Petition of Seattle, 638 P.2d 549, 556-57 (Wash. 1981). Finally, New
Hampshire, Massachusetts, and Montana all use a test that weighs the net public and private
benefits of the taking to determine whether it is for a private purpose. Appeal of City of
Keene, 693 A.2d 412, 416 (N.H. 1997); Opinion of the Justices, 250 N.E.2d 547, 558-60
(Mass. 1969); City of Bozeman v. Vaniman, 898 P.2d 1208, 1214 (Mont. 1995).
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Because the Hathcock Tests promulgated by the Michigan Supreme Court
would have provided the needed balance between community and individual
interests, the Supreme Court should have adopted it.
200
The Michigan Supreme Court penned one of the most infamous decisions
in Takings Clause history in Poletown. Indeed, many consider the Kelo deci-
sion to be equally heinous, but with greater reach.2"' To correct its error in
Poletown, the Michigan Supreme Court ultimately adopted a series of tests that
protected individual property rights and reinforced the Michigan takings clause.
The Supreme Court should have adopted the Hathcock Tests because they
would have more adequately protected individual property interests while at the
same time affording state legislatures the necessary power and discretion to
improve their communities.
Hathcock requires that the proposed public use or benefit qualify under
one of three possible tests. First, "the exercise of eminent domain for private
corporations [must be] limited to those enterprises generating public benefit
whose very existence depends upon the use of land that can be assembled only
by the coordination that the central government is alone capable of achieving"
("Necessity Test").2 °2 Second, a public use exists where the private entity
remains accountable to the public in its use of that property ("Public Accounta-
bility Test"). 20 3 Third, eminent domain is appropriate if the selection of the
condemned land for a private interest is based on immediate public concerns
and facts of independent public significance ("Public Concern Test"). 20 4 This
section will evaluate the benefits of each test and apply each of the three tests
to Kelo.
1. The Necessity Test
The Necessity Test limits "the exercise of eminent domain for private cor-
porations . . .to those enterprises generating public benefit whose very exis-
tence depends upon the use of land that can be assembled only by the
coordination that the central government is alone capable of achieving. '20 5 For
example, railroads, roads, highways, water lines, sewer lines, levies, and elec-
tricity lines are all examples of private business needs that only the government
can provide.
This test is better than the Kelo framework of "let the legislature do what
it wants to do if it has a carefully formulated plan" for several reasons. 2 6 First,
this test ensures that eminent domain is an option of last resort because projects
that could possibly be located elsewhere without the need of eminent domain
would be excluded. This would include, among other things, shopping centers,
200 County of Wayne v. Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d 765 (Mich. 2004).
201 See generally, Mackinac Center for Public Policy, U.S. Supreme Court Today Delivered
Flawed Decision in Kelo v. New London, June 23, 2005, http://www.mackinac.org/article.
aspx?ID=7145 (commenting that there was still a "silver lining" for Michigan because the
Michigan Supreme Court overruled Poletown in Hathcock).
202 Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d at 781 (emphasis in original) (citing Poletown Neighborhood
Council v. City of Detroit, 304 N.W.2d 455, 478 (Mich. 1981)).
203 Id. at 782.
204 Id. at 782-83.
205 Id. at 781.
206 Kelo v. City of New London, 125 S. Ct. 2655, 2665 (2005).
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malls, and hotels. Second, this test ensures that individual property rights,
communities, and the government's power of eminent domain are all protected
against undue private influences. Finally, because local governments can only
use eminent domain for essential projects, the Necessity Test deters the practice
of rent seeking by large corporations and developers.
In applying the necessity test to the facts of Kelo, the construction of pri-
vate office space and associated parking are reminiscent of the facts involved in
Hathcock. In Hathcock, the Michigan Supreme Court stated that eminent
domain is not appropriate for an area that is "flecked with shopping centers,
office parks, clusters of hotels, and centers of entertainment and commerce. "207
New London, and other local governments, would have a difficult time justify-
ing that that their use of eminent domain for private office space and parking is
essential and could not be provided in a new and different location.
One may argue that the shops and parking lots must be within a close
geographic proximity to the Pfizer facility in Kelo, or the Airport in Hathcock,
in order to benefit the Pfizer facility. This argument fails under the Necessity
Test for two reasons. First, the development companies had already purchased
a significant amount of property in a more appropriate manner, without displac-
ing property owners. The fact that this land could be used for parking or shops
and had already been purchased tends to undermine the argument that the use
of eminent domain was "necessary." Second, the purpose of the Pfizer research
facility is research, not parking or shopping. Even if there was no parking or
shopping close by, the fundamental purpose for the use of eminent domain,
pharmaceutical research, would still exist. It is difficult to understand how the
mere existence of several well-kept homes and yards in the vicinity of the
research facility would have stymied any research pursuits. Essentially, the
land for parking and shopping was not necessary, just highly desirable.
2. Public Accountability Test
The second Hathcock factor reviews whether a private entity benefiting
from the use of eminent domain will remain accountable to the public for its
use of that property through the local government. For example, most private
transit systems, health providers, public utilities, stadiums and private parks are
functioning under the control of the local government.2 °8
In Hathcock, the Michigan Supreme Court held that the Pinnacle Project
did not qualify under the Public Accountability Test. The court noted that pri-
vate owners would "pursue their own financial welfare with the single-minded-
ness expected of any profit-making enterprise. '219 In addition, according to the
court, there is no "formal mechanism" to ensure that the businesses would con-
tinue to benefit the local economy. 10
This test is critical because it serves as a reminder that eminent domain
exists to satisfy the necessities of the people. As one legal analyst stated:
207 Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d at 783.
208 Kochan, supra note 6, at 63. See also Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2673. (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting).
209 Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d at 784.
210 Id.
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[T]he Supreme Court majority today essentially endorsed the government's position
that public officials can justify takings of private property for the purpose of increas-
ing government tax revenues. If the government can expel people from their homes
in order to increase the amount of taxes that other people will be forced to pay, it
reverses the proper relationship between the people and the government, where the
government serves the people-not the other way around."
2 11
This test provides a means for the government to do the very things that
individuals cannot provide for themselves-connect private roads to the public,
provide easy access to doctors via ambulances and other public services. In
fact, this test discourages private developers from going to the expense of
acquiring certain lands when they cannot exercise unfettered control over the
lands.
In Kelo, a condemned parcel would provide private office spaces and
parking for private companies. The developer in-turn would pay the city one
dollar for a ninety-nine year lease in order to have full control over marketing
and locating tenants. The government would have no formal mechanism or
method to control the developer, the tenants, or their personal motivations
directed toward their own financial success.
3. Public Concern Test
The third test developed in Hathcock questions whether the selection of
the condemned land for a private interest is based on immediate public con-
cerns and facts of independent public significance.2 1 2 Under this factor, the
community would be able to provide for community needs that are immediate
and serious such as the elimination of blighted areas such as in Berman, or the
removal of an unwanted economic hindrance like the oligopoly in Midkiff.
Other examples might include areas that are troubled by fire hazards, drugs,
gangs, unpleasant odors (like those from a tannery or slaughterhouse), or
eyesores.
In Hathcock, the Michigan Supreme Court found that there was nothing in
the Pinnacle Project that hinted that the public good was the main reason for
condemnation.21 3 Contrary to this factor, the only public benefits to be derived
from the project were to occur after the condemnation, not before.2 14
In Kelo, this test appears to fail. By all accounts, the condemned area was
not blighted nor did it have any problems of public significance that would
require the government to intervene. The principal uses for the property were
not to correct a pressing public problem, but purely to obtain potential eco-
nomic benefits.
V. CONCLUSION
Gordon Gecko, one of the most infamous characters in cinematic history,
made the historic insight that "greed-for lack of a better word-is good.
211 See Mackinac Center for Public Policy, supra note 201 (quoting Patrick Wright)
(emphasis added).
212 Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d at 783.
213 Id.
214 Id. at 784.
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Greed is right. Greed works. Greed clarifies, cuts through and captures the
essence of the evolutionary spirit.' '2 15 In Kelo, the Supreme Court seems to
have agreed with Mr. Gecko holding not only that greed is good, but constitu-
tional if that same greed can possibly lead to economic development. More
specifically, the Court held that the government may take private property and
transfer it to a different private owner under the Takings Clause, so long as the
property can possibly be upgraded to benefit a community.
21 6
Although the avarice may not agree, individual property rights are not
only a public good, but are also a cornerstone of American liberty and a critical
component of our free society. As John Locke stated, "[lt]he great end and
utility of Mens entering into Society, [is] the enjoyment of their Properties in
Peace and Safety," or, in other words, the principal reason for society is the
preservation of a man's property. 217 The Court was wrong to abdicate its
proper role as the guardian of individual property rights and should have imple-
mented a balanced test to bolster the integrity of the Takings Clause and prop-
erly check the power of the legislatures.
The Hathcock Tests would adequately provide reasonable restraints on
legislatures by allowing court mandated restrictions. Legislatures would still
be able to use eminent domain to improve local communities, but only if the
taking passed the Necessity Test, Public Accountability Test, or Public Concern
Test. The case at hand, Kelo, would not have passed the Hathcock Tests
because there is no discernable use outside of the vague and speculative
promises made by the city of New London. Indeed, perhaps after Kelo, Ameri-
cans will better understand the wisdom of the sentiments of William Pitt the
Elder when he said:
The poorest man may, in his cottage, bid defiance to all the forces of the Crown. It
may be frail; its roof may shake; the wind may blow through it; the storm may enter;
the rain may enter; but the King of England may not enter; all his forces dare not
cross the threshold of the ruined tenement.
2 18
215 WALL STREET (20th Century Fox 1987).
216 Kelo v. City of New London, 125 S. Ct. 2655, 2671 (2005) (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
217 See JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT 401 (Peter Laslett ed., New
American Library 1965) (1690).
218 NELSON B. LASSON, I THE HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 49-50 (Da Capo Press 1970) (quoting Pitt's 1763
speech in the House of Lords).
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